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Kensinger v. Abbott Laboratores: DES
and the Statute of Limitations
In Kensinger v. Abbott Laboratories,' the California Court of
Appeal for the First District considered the question of when the
statute of limitations begins to run in products liability cases involv-
ing diethylstilbestrol. Diethylstilbestrol, commonly known as DES, is
a synthetic estrogen that between 1947 and 1971 was prescribed to
pregnant women to prevent pregnancy complications. 2 The trial court
in Kensinger granted a summary judgment in favor of the defendant
manufacturers based upon the applicable one year statute of limita-
tions for personal injury actions and application of the "rule of
discovery."' The rule of discovery suspends the running of the statute
of limitations until the plaintiff is aware of both the harm suffered
and the cause of the injury.4 In reversing the lower court, the court
of appeal held that the statute of limitations does not begin to run
until the plaintiff discovers, or with reasonable diligence should have
discovered, wrongful conduct by the manufacturer. 5 In reaching this
conclusion, the court has expanded the rule of discovery involved in
DES cases.
Part I of this note summarizes the facts of Kensinger and reviews
the opinion of the Court of Appeal for the First District.6 Part II
examines the legal background of statutes of limitations.7 Finally, Part
III discusses the legal ramifications of the opinion in Kensinger.8
I. THE CASE
A. The Facts
DES is a synthetic estrogen that was prescribed to women to pre-
vent miscarriages and other pregnancy complications. 9 As a result of
1. 171 Cal. App. 3d 376, 217 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1985), modified 172 Cal. App. 3d 210b (1985).
2. Note, Delayed Manifestation Injuries: The Statute of Limitations as a Bar to DES
Suits, 11 COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REV. 127, 127 (1979/1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Delayed
Manifestation Injuries]; Scott, Products Liability, 1982 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 709, 709 (1982);
Note, Statutes of Limitations: The Special Problem of DES Suits, 7 AM. J.L. & MED. 91,
91-92 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Special Problem].
3. See Kensinger, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 380, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 314-15.
4. Id. at 383, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 316; Leaf v. City of San Mateo, 104 Cal. App. 3d 398,
407, 163 Cal. Rptr. 711, 716 (1980).
5. Kensinger, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 386, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 319.
6. See infra notes 9-54 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 55-91 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 92-119 and accompanying text.
9. Note, Delayed Manifestation Injuries, supra note 2, at 127; Scott, supra note 2, at
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the high incidence of cancer found among daughters of women who
used DES while pregnant, manufacturers ceased to market DES for
pregnancy complications after 1971.10 Georgiann Kensinger was exposed
to DES in utero." In August 1974, she was diagnosed as having clear
cell adenocarcinoma of the vagina and cervix, a cancer linked to DES."2
Subsequently, Kensinger underwent surgery and was given a radium
implant. She was informed by doctors, at the time of surgery, that
her cancer was caused by her exposure to DES in utero.'3
Plaintiff reached the age of majority in 1977 and by this time had
overheard a conversation between her parents that Eli Lilly and Com-
pany was the probable manufacturer of the DES taken by her mother. 4
In 1977 Kensinger also believed that both the discomfort she felt during
sexual relations and her inability to bear children were related to the
DES and her subsequent surgery.'" When Kensinger's father consulted
an attorney in 1977, however, he was informed that his daughter could
not bring a successful lawsuit against the manufacturer.' 6
In 1980, however, Kensinger did file suit after learning of Sindell
v. Abbott Laboratories,'7 a successful action against DES manufac-
turers in which the plaintiff recovered without identifying a specific
manufacturer.' 8 Kensinger also claimed that prior to 1980 she was
unaware of tortious conduct on the part of DES manufacturers. 9
In her suit against several manufacturers, Kensinger set forth causes
of action for negligence, strict products liability, breach of implied
709; Note, The Special Problem, supra note 2, at 91-92. The facts are taken from the opinion
of the court of appeal.
10. See Kensinger, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 380, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 315, modified 172 Cal.
App. 3d 210b (1985). See also Note, The Special Problem, supra note 2, at 91-94.
11. Kensinger, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 380, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 315.
12. Id. Clear cell adenocarcinoma of the vagina is extremely rare. Before clear cell adenocar-
cinoma developed in daughters of DES users, the cancer had never been diagnosed in women
under the age of 30. Note, The Special Problem, supra note 2, at 93 n.14; Note, Delayed
Manifestation Injuries, supra note 2, at 135. The increase of this rare cancer in teenage girls
led to a statistical link between the use of DES and cancer. Note, Delayed Manifestation Injuries,
supra note 2, at 128 n.4. Besides adenocarcinoma, DES has also been linked to dysplasia,
adenosis, cervical erosion, and cervical ridges. See Biebel, DES Litigation and the Problem
of Causation, 51 INs. CouNs. J. 223, 225 (1984).
13. Kensinger, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 380, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 315.
14. Id. at 380-81, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 315.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 381, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 315.
17. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912
(1980).
18. See Kensinger, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 381, 382, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 315, 316. See Sindell,
26 Cal. 3d at 610-13, 607 P.2d at 936-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144-46.
19. Kensinger, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 382, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 316. Failure to adequately test
the effects of DES upon the offspring of DES users and failure to adequately warn of the
known risks of DES, constituted the tortious conduct by DES manufacturers. Id.
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warranty, breach of express warranty, and fraud. 20 After a full hear-
ing on defendant's motion for summary judgment, the trial court
granted the motion, concluding that the statute of limitations had
run on Kensinger's claim.2'
B. The Opinion
The only question before the court of appeal was whether or not
the statute of limitations barred the cause of action as a matter of
law.22 For personal injury actions the statute of limitations period
is one year.2" The statute of limitations begins to run when all essen-
tial elements of the cause of action have taken place.2" Generally,
the limitations period commences even though the plaintiff is unaware
of the existence of the action or the identity of the responsible party.25
In some situations, however, the rule of discovery is applied pre-
venting the commencement of the limitations period until the plain-
tiff has discovered, or should have discovered through reasonable
diligence, the injury and the cause of the injury. 26 This rule is ap-
plied only in cases when a plaintiff suffers a harm "without percepti-
ble trauma" and is "blamelessly ignorant" of the cause of injury.27
In Kensinger both parties agreed that the rule of discovery applied
to the case.28
Kensinger claimed that the limitations period did not commence
until 1980 when she learned of the California Supreme Court deci-
sion in Sindell.29 She further claimed that until 1980 she did not know
20. Id. at 379, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 314.
21. Id. at 380, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 315.
22. See id. at 381-82, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 315-16.
23. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §340. The code section states: "Within one year . . . (3) An
action for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment, seduction of a person below the
age of legal consent, or for injury to or for the death of one caused by the wrongful act
or neglect of another ..... Id.
24. Kensinger, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 381, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 315; Leaf v. City of San Mateo,
104 Cal. App. 3d 398, 407, 163 Cal. Rptr. 711, 716 (1980); Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy,
Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 187, 491 P.2d 421, 428, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 844 (1971).
25. Kensinger, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 381, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 316; Neel, 6 Cal. 3d at 187,
491 P.2d at 428, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 844; Howe v. Pioneer Mfg. Co., 262 Cal. App. 2d 330,
340, 68 Cal. Rptr. 617, 623 (1968).
26. Kensinger, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 381, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 316; Leaf, 104 Cal. App. 3d
at 407, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
27. Kensinger, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 381, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 316; Frederick v. Cabio Phar-
maceuticals, 89 Cal. App. 3d 49, 58-59, 152 Cal. Rptr. 292, 297-98 (1979).
28. Kensinger, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 382, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
29. Id. Sindell allowed a cause of action against several manufacturers of DES even though
the plaintiff did not know which manufacturer produced the DES that caused her injury. The
court in Sindell shifted the burden of proof, requiring the defendants to show that they did
not produce the harmful DES. A failure on the part of the defendants to meet this burden
1533
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of any tortious conduct on the part of the defendants.3" The defen-
dants claimed that the limitations period began in 1977 when Kensinger
reached the age of majority. 3' The defendants contended that by this
time Kensinger had reached the age of majority and was aware of
the injury and the negligent cause.32
After outlining the contentions of the parties, the court of appeal
next examined the rule of discovery in California. The court noted
that the rule is objective in nature because the limitations period will
run even though a plaintiff has no actual knowledge of the cause
or the injury. Possession of presumptive knowledge of injury and the
cause of the injury will begin the limitations period.33 A plaintiff will
have presumptive knowledge when the plaintiff has notice or infor-
mation of circumstances which would put a reasonable person on in-
quiry, or when the plaintiff has an opportunity to obtain knowledge
from sources available to the plaintiff. 3
The justices noted that the statute of limitations may be tolled only
for a belated discovery of facts, not for a belated discovery of a legal
theory." The court acknowledged, however, that the distinction bet-
ween legal theories and operative facts is not easy to draw.36 In pro-
ducts liability cases for example, a plaintiff may be aware of the cause
and the injury and not have any knowledge of wrongdoing by a par-
ticular defendant. 37 The court felt that barring a plaintiff's cause of
action when the plaintiff knew of the cause and the injury but did
not know of wrongdoing on the part of a defendant would be
unreasonable. 3 The court further said that Kensinger had stated that
subjects them to liability according to their respective market shares. See Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d
at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
30. Kensinger, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 382, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
31. Id. The age of majority in California is 18. CAL. CIV. CODE §25. The statute of limita-
tions is tolled if the cause of action accrued before the injured person reached the age of
majority. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §352.
32. Kensinger, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 382, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
33. See id. at 383, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 317. The court in Kensinger quoted Sanchez v. South
Hoover Hosp., 18 Cal. 3d 93, 553 P.2d 1129, 132 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1976), which stated: "[Wjhen
the plaintiff has notice or information of circumstances to put a reasonable person on inquiry,
or has the opportunity to obtain knowledge from sources open to his investigation . . . the
statute commences to run." Kensinger, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 383, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 317 (citing
Sanchez, 18 Cal. 3d at 101, 553 P.2d at 1135, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 663) (emphasis in original).
34. Call v. Kezirian, 135 Cal. App. 3d 189, 195-96, 185 Cal. Rptr. 103, 107 (1982); McGee
v. Weinberg, 97 Cal. App. 3d 798, 803, 159 Cal. Rptr. 86, 89-90 (1979).
35. Kensinger, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 383-84, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 317; McGee, 97 Cal. App.
3d at 803, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
36. Kensinger, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 384, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 317.
37. Id. The court stated: "Knowledge of the occurence and origin of harm cannot necessarily
be equated with knowledge of the factual basis for a legal remedy." Id.
38. See id. at 384, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 317-18. The court noted that the reason for the
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she was unaware of a factual basis for a remedy until 1980, which
was about three years later than the time she became aware of her
injury and the cause of that injury.39 The court found that Kensinger's
contention that she did not know of wrongdoing on the part of the
manufacturer raised a question of fact for the jury to decide. 0 The
court found, therefore, that the summary judgment was inappropriate
because the record was deyoid of evidence that established that Kens-
inger should have been aware of wrongful conduct by the manufac-
turer as a matter of law."
To reinforce the decision the court examined the trend in cases out-
side of California, finding the Rhode Island case of Anthony v. Abbott
Laboratories42 especially persuasive. "3 Anthony was a DES case in
which the Rhode Island Supreme Court found that the statute of
limitations did not run until the plaintiff had discovered, or should
have discovered, wrongdoing on the part of the manufacturer." The
Anthony court noted that one purpose of statutes of limitations was
to prevent stale claims. The court reasoned that this purpose would
not be furthered when a plaintiff has not unreasonably delayed in
statute of limitations was to block claims that had become stale due to a plaintiff's neglect
or inattentiveness. When the plaintiff is not aware that rights have been violated, however,
the application of the statute of limitations would be unjust. Id.
39. See id. at 384, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 318. The decision may seem initially to rest partly
on the timing of the decision in Sindell and partly on plaintiff's discovery of wrongdoing by
the manufacturer. The court, however, noted that prior to Sindell the statute of limitations
was operative and that Sindell only represented a policy statement by the California Supreme
Court easing the way for DES victims. This suggests that 1980 is the applicable time of com-
mencement of the statute of limitations because Kensinger claimed that she heard of wrong-
doing by the manufacturer in 1980, not because of the decision in Sindell. See id. at 385 n.2,
217 Cal. Rptr. at 318 n.2.
40. Id. at 384, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 318.
41. Id. at 386, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 319.
42. 490 A.2d 43 (R.I. 1985).
43. Id. at 384-85, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 318. The court stated: "We perceive in the recent
case law on the subject of drug product liability torts an emerging trend to commence the
period of limitations only when a plaintiff knows or should have known of some wrongdoing
by a drug manufacturer." Id. (emphasis in original). The court cited Goodman v. Mead Johnson
& Co., 534 F.2d 566 (3rd Cir. 1976); Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919 (8th
Cir. 1970); Dawson v. Eli Lilly & Co., 543 F. Supp. 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Anthony v. Abbott
Laboratories, 490 A.2d 43 (R.I. 1985); and Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 371 A.2d 170 (N.H.
1977). Kensinger, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 385, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 318.
44. Anthony, 490 A.2d at 46. The court stated:
[I]n a drug products-liability action where the manifestation of an injury, the cause
of that injury, and the person's knowledge of the wrongdoing by the manufacturer
occur at different points in time, the running of the statute of limitations would
begin when the person discovers, or with reasonable diligence should have discovered
the wrongful conduct of the manufacturer.
Id.
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bringing an action. 5 The court noted that a plaintiff who has suf-
fered an adverse effect due to a particular drug may not have any
reason to know that there was wrongful conduct on the part of a
particular manufacturer."
The Rhode Island Supreme Court also found that extending the
rule of discovery would not unduly prejudice manufacturers.47 The
court said that part of the reasoning behind statutes of limitations
was to prevent unfairness to defendants who have to defend their
conduct with "faded memories.""' In drug product liability cases the
evidence is documentary in nature so that a delay in presentation of
evidence would not be a major concern. 9 The Anthony court con-
cluded by finding that adoption of the expanded rule of discovery
would motivate manufacturers to improve testing, marketing, and
public disclosure of potential danger."
In Kensinger, the California Court of Appeal for the First District
adopted the reasoning of Anthony."' The court felt that the reason-
ing of Anthony paralleled the reasoning of the California Supreme
Court in Sindell. 2 The court in Sindell found that the negligent defen-
dant, rather than the innocent plaintiff, should bear the costs of in-
jury because defendants are better able to bear the costs of injury.
The Sindell court also reasoned that the manufacturer is in the best
position to guard against defects, and that the manufacturer is in the
better position to warn against defects." The Kensinger court followed
the reasoning of Anthony and Sindell and concluded that the statute
of limitations does not begin to run in DES cases until "plaintiff
discovers or with reasonable diligence should have discovered the drug
manufacturer's wrongful conduct."5 4
45. Id. at 47.
46. Id. The court did acknowledge that there will be occasions when an adverse reaction
to a drug will alert any reasonable person of wrongful conduct. This, however, would be a
question of fact. Id. at 47 n.2.
47. Id. at 47.
48. Id.
49. Id. The court reasoned that in product liability drug cases the unfair prejudice due
to faded memories would fall more on plaintiffs than defendants. The court further noted
that the plaintiff still has the burden of proof in these cases and lost evidence will make meeting
the burden of proof that much harder. Id. at 47-48.
50. Id. at 48.
51. Kensinger, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 385, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 318.
52. Id.
53. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 610-12, 607 P.2d at 936-37, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144-45.
54. Kensinger, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 386, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 319.
1536
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Statutes of Limitations
Statutes of limitations are enacted to prevent assertion of a claim
after varying periods of time depending on the particular cause of
action.55 Several reasons have been put forward to justify creation
and application of statutes of limitations. First, statutes of limita-
tions insure fairness to defendants by relieving them of liability when
a plaintiff has knowingly and unreasonably delayed action on a claim.56
Second, statutes of limitations insure prompt assertion of claims, reduc-
ing the chance that evidence will be lost.57 Third, statutes of limita-
tions prohibit assertion of stale claims which would otherwise result
in nearly unlimited liability in the commercial world."
Early California cases held that statutes of limitations began to run
at the time the act causing harm was committed, even though the
harm was not apparent until much later.5 9 The courts, however, were
willing to toll the statute of limitations when a defendant had inten-
tionally misled a plaintiff.6" Overly strict application of statutes of
limitations has been attacked by both judges and commentators as
harsh.6 The California Court of Appeal for the First District stated:
"It is not the policy of the law to unjustly deprive one of his
remedy." 62 In contrast to this view, other writers have suggested that
55. See, e.g., CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE §§340 (one year statute of limitations for causes
of action including personal injury and negligence); 340.5 (three year statute of limitations for
medical malpractice with a one year rule of discovery); 340.6 (four year statue of limitations
for legal malpractice with a one year rule of discovery).
56. Note, The Special Problem, supra note 2, at 99.
57. Id. at 99-100.
58. Id. at 100.
59. See, e.g., Gum v. Allen, 119 Cal. App. 293, 295, 6 P.2d 311, 312 (1931) (this case
was overruled in Huysman v. Kirsch, 6 Cal. 2d 302, 311, 57 P.2d 908, 912 (1936)). Plaintiff
filed a negligence cause of action against a doctor who inadvertently left a gauze patch in
plaintiff during surgery. The California Court of Appeal for the Second District held that
the action was barred by the statute of limitations because the original operation occured more
than one year before the filing of the lawsuit even though plaintiff was not aware of the gauze
until a second surgery one month prior to the legal action. Gum, 119 Cal. App. at 295, 6
P.2d at 312.
60. Id. at 296, 6 P.2d at 312-13. See 3 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CIVIL PROCEDURE, Actions
§414 (3d ed. 1985).
61. See Leaf v. City of San Mateo, 104 Cal. App. 3d 398, 406, 163 Cal. Rptr. 711, 715
(1980); Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 192, 491 P.2d 421,
431, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 847 (1971); Note, The Special Problem, supra note 2, at 96; 3 B.
WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CIVIL PROCEDURE, Actions §414 (3d ed. 1985). But see McGee v. Weinberg,
97 Cal. App. 3d 798, 804, 159 Cal. Rptr. 86, 90 (1979). The California Court of Appeal
for the Second District stated: "Statutes of limitations are not disfavored in the law. To the
contrary they are favored in the law because they promote desirable social ends and give security
and stability to human affairs." Id.
62. Howe v. Pioneer Mfg. Co., 262 Cal. App. 2d 330, 346, 68 Cal. Rptr. 617, 627 (1968).
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some limitation on recovery must be present to achieve practicality
and justice.63
B. Rule of Discovery
The rule of discovery is a judicial creation intended to reduce the
impact of strict application of statutes of limitations.6 4 If a plaintiff
suffers an injury "without perceptible trauma" and is "blamelessly
ignorant" of the cause of the injury, the statute of limitations is
tolled.6" When these factors are present the rule of discovery pro-
vides that the statute of limitations is tolled until the plaintiff knows
or through reasonable diligence should know of an injury and the
cause of that injury."'
In Marsh v. Industrial Accident Commission, 7 the California
Supreme Court found that when an injury is a progressive disease,
the statute of limitations does not run until the disease culminates
in disability." Marsh was extended by the California Supreme Court
in Huysman v. Kirsch 6 to include actions for medical malpractice."'
The Huysman court concluded that the statute of limitations should
not run while a plaintiff is ignorant of the cause of the injury and
while the plaintiff could not through reasonable diligence and care
ascertain the cause.7'
Since Huysman, the rule of discovery has been extended. to several
more causes of action, including products liability." In addition to
products liability, the rule of discovery has been extended to actions
63. Dworkin, Product Liability of the 1980s: "Repose is not the Destiny" of Manufac-
turers, 61 N.C.L. REV. 33, 36 (1982). The author stated: "Stability and predictability are con-
sidered crucial in the business context if commerce is to thrive." Id. at 37-38. See Fischer,
Products Liability-An Analysis of Market Share Liability, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1623, 1651 (1981)
(noting that excessive liability on manufacturers will inhibit the production that led to a greater
standard of living for America).
64. Leaf, 104 Cal. App. 3d at 406-07, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 715; Note, The Special Problem,
supra note 2, at 96.
65. Pereira v. Dow Chemical Co., 129 Cal. App. 3d 865, 873-74, 181 Cal. Rptr. 364, 369
(1982); Leaf, 104 Cal. App. 3d at 408, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 716; Frederick v. Cabio Pharmaceuticals,
89 Cal. App. 3d 49, 58-59, 152 Cal. Rptr. 292, 297-98 (1979); G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior
Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 25, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218, 220 (1975).
66. Leaf, 104 Cal. App. 3d at 407, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 716; G.D. Searle & Co., 49 Cal.
App. 3d at 25, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
67. 217 Cal. 338, 18 P.2d 933 (1933).
68. Id. at 351, 18 P.2d at 938. The problem involved in Marsh was pneumonoconiosis
silicosis which was caused by exposure to silica dust over a long period of time. Id. at 340,
18 P.2d at 934. See 3 B. WITKIN, CALHFORNIA CIVIL PROCEDURE, Actions §410 (3d ed. 1985).
69. 6 Cal. 2d 302, 57 P.2d 908 (1936).
70. Id. at 312-13, 57 P.2d at 913.
71. Id. at 312, 57 P.2d at 913.
72. G.D. Searle & Co., 49 Cal. App. 3d at 25-26, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
1538
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against accountants, 3 stockbrokers,74 title companies, 75 insurance
agents, 6  and attorneys. The legislature has applied the rule of
discovery to medical malpractice,"7 legal malpractice,"7 and in cases
involving exposure to asbestos."0 While the legislature has codified
the rule of discovery for some causes of action, the legislature has
not modified or adopted the judicially created rule of discovery for
products liability.8'
C. Expanding the Rule of Discovery
Prior to Kensinger, the rule of discovery in California drug pro-
ducts liability cases had only two elements. A plaintiff had to know,
or with reasonable diligence be able to discover, the injury and the
cause of that injury.82 This rule has been stated as delaying the accrual
of the cause of action until the plaintiff knows, or should know, of
all essential facts of the cause of action.83
In Leaf v. City of San Mateo,8 ' the California Court of Appeal
for the First District suggested addition of a third tier to the rule
of discovery in an inverse condemnation case against a city for defective
drainage systems.85 The court found that the cause of action accrued
from the time when the plaintiffs became aware, or should have
become aware, of the negligent conduct of the city as the cause of
the damage.8 6
73. Moonie v. Lynch, 256 Cal. App. 2d 361, 365-66, 64 Cal. Rptr. 55, 58 (1967).
74. Twomey v. Mitchem, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 725-27, 69
Cal. Rptr. 222, 246-47 (1968).
75. Cook v. Redwood Empire Title Co., 275 Cal. App. 2d 452, 454-55, 79 Cal. Rptr.
888, 889-90 (1969).
76. United States Liab. Ins. Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc., I Cal. 3d 586, 597-98, 463
P.2d 770, 776-77, 83 Cal. Rptr. 418, 424-25 (1970).
77. Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 190, 491 P.2d
421, 430, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 846 (1971).
78. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §340.5.
79. Id. §340.6.
80. Id. §340.2.
81. Compare CA. Crv. PROC. CODE §340 (statute of limitations for products liability actions
without a rule of discovery) with CA. Crv. PROC. CODE §340.5 (statute of limitations for medical
malpractice including a rule of discovery).
82. Pereira, 129 Cal. App. 3d at 873, 181 Cal. Rptr at 369; G.D. Searle & Co., 49 Cal.
App. 3d at 25, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 220 (1975).
83. Pereira, 129 Cal. App. 3d at 873, 181 Cal. Rptr at 369; Neel, 6 Cal. 3d at 190, 491
P.2d at 430, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
84. 104 Cal. App. 3d 398, 163 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1980).
85. Id. at 408, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
86. Id. at 408, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
1539
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Relying mainly on Anthony v. Abbott Laboratories,7 the court
in Kensinger added a third tier to the rule of discovery for use in
DES cases, finding that the statute of limitations is tolled until the
plaintiff discovers, or should have have discovered, wrongful con-
duct." The Kensinger court adopted the reasoning of Anthony that
delaying accrual of a cause of action until a plaintiff discovers or
should have discovered wrongdoing on the part of a manufacturer
will not undermine the purposes of statutes of limitations.89 Further,
the court noted that the adoption of this rule would encourage
manufacturers to test their products thoroughly and to warn the public
concerning the potential dangers of their products. 90 This outcome
was consistent with the reasoning of the California Supreme Court
in Sindell, that a manufacturer, was better able to bear the costs of
injury, to discover possible defects in a product, and to guara against
those defects causing harm.9'
III. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS
The total number of DES lawsuits could be staggering. Estimates
have indicated that more than 500,000 women in the United States
are DES daughters.92 While only a small percentage of these women
have contracted cancer because of DES, 93 the final number of DES
cancer victims presently remains unknown. 94 One estimate, however,
places the potential monetary damages to DES daughters in the billions
of dollars. 95
87. 490 A.2d 43 (R.I. 1985). See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
88. Kensinger, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 384-86, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 318-19.
89. Id. at 385-86, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 318-19.
90. Id. at 385, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 318.
91. Id.
92. Note, The Sjecial Problem, supra note 2, at 94. See Biebel, supra note 12, at 225
(estimating that between 1.5 and 3 million offspring were born to DES mothers); Note, Tort
Law-Emotional Distress and Wrongful Life Claims in DES Litigation, 6 W. NEw ENO. L.
REv. 1037, 1037 (1984) (estimating that as many as 3 million women took DES while pregnant).
93. Note, The Special Problem, supra note 2, at 94. Estimates of the number of DES
daughters that will develop adenocarcinoma range from I in 1,000 to 4 in 1,000. See Biebel,
supra note 12, at 225.
94. Id.; Note, Delayed Manifestation Injuries, supra note 2, at 128. The injuries caused
by DES are not manifested for at least 10 to 12 years. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 594, 607 P.2d
at 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133. DES daughters generally develop cancer from age 7 to 29 with
the peak at age 19 and a moderate frequency into the twenties. Biebel, supra note 12, at 225.
As DES was prescribed through 1971 for pregnancy complications, a probability exists of in-
creased numbers of DES cancer victims in the years ahead. See Note, Delayed Manlfestation
Injuries, supra note 2, at 128-30. If the number of DES daughters ranges from .5 to 3 million
women, and the frequency of cancer is between .001 and .004, then the number of potential
DES cancer victims ranges from 500 to 12,000.
95. Fischer, supra note 62, at 1624.
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The decision in Kensinger applies specifically to DES lawsuits.96
Since the statute of limitations defense is raised by an increasing
number of DES manufacturers,97 Kensinger clearly will have an im-
pact on DES cases. The addition of a third tier to the rule of discovery
enables DES daughters who eventually discover the existence of DES
related cancer to overcome the potential bar of the statute of limita-
tions by pleading and proving that they were justifiably unaware of
wrongful conduct by the manufacturer.9"
The ultimate impact of Kensinger in DES cases, however, is going
to be greatest on cases already in the judicial system. The test applied
in Kensinger is not whether the plaintiff knew of wrongdoing, but
whether the plaintiff should have known. 99 If information is available
to plaintiffs that DES was administered to pregnant women because
of negligent actions on the part of manufacturers, and if manufac-
turers are able to show that the information was available, then the
statute of limitations may not be tolled.' The more time that passes
and the greater the dissemination of information, the greater the
likelihood that manufacturers will meet this burden, and the greater
the likelihood that plaintiffs will not be able to toll the statute of
limitations.0,
The decision in Kensinger applies expressly to DES cases, but
whether the third tier of the rule of discovery applies beyond DES
cases is uncertain. Several aspects of the DES cases, however, are
similar to other factual situations. The most closely analogous situa-
tion would be product liability actions based on defects of other drugs.
Other drugs present potentially the same possibility of delayed
manifestation as DES.1"2 Additionally, market share liability under
96. Kensinger, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 386, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 319.
97. See Note, The Special Problem, supra note 2, at 95.
98. See Kensinger, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 386, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 319. The court in Kensinger
interpreted Sindell as a policy statement by the California Supreme Court that the procedural
obstacles to cases involving DES should be reduced. Id. at 385 n.2, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 318 n.2.
99. Id. at 386, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 319.
100. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. The objective portion of the discovery rule
is not meant to create an insurmountable burden to manufacturers. Rather, "[t]he phrase
'should have discovered' is meant to bar non-diligent plaintiffs who ignore symptoms or do
not seek medical advise in time to file suit against possible wrongdoers." Comment, Statutes
of Limitations in Occupational Disease Cases: Is Locke v. Johns-Manvile A Viable Alternative
to the Discovery Rule?, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 263, 281 (1982).
101. DES cases have been widely publicized over the last several years in major newspapers.
See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1984, §A, at 61, col. 1 (article about New Jersey Supreme
Court reviving a suit involving DES); Id., Oct. 16, 1984, §D, at 2, col. I (article about appor-
tioning of liability in DES suits); Id., Feb. 3, 1984, §C, at 13, col. I (article about Michigan
Supreme Court allowing a suit against DES manufacturers).
102. Note, The Special Problem, supra note 2, at 100 (noting that delayed manifestation
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Sindell may apply to other drug manufacturers,' 3 For these cases,
when a plaintiff suffers an injury without "perceptible trauma" and
is "blamelessly ignorant" of the cause of the injury, the statute of
limitations should not run until the plaintiff discovers or should have
discovered wrongdoing on the part of the manufacturer.
Commentators have suggested that, as applied to drug products
liability, the rule of discovery does not conflict with the underlying
purposes of the statutes of limitations.' 4 First, a plaintiff suffering
from adverse reactions to drugs has not unreasonably delayed the asser-
tion of the action. Rather, the suit is delayed because the onset of
the injury was delayed.' 5 Second, the evidence used in a drug pro-
ducts liability case is usually documentary in nature so that the potential
for lost evidence is less than might be possible with other causes of
action.'0 6 Third, the disruption of business due to delayed causes of
action is outweighed by the injustice of depriving an injured plaintiff
of a remedy when the delay is due to the drug, not the plaintiff's
inattentiveness.'0 " In drug products liability cases especially, the drug
companies are probably aware that the adverse effects of their drugs
will not be apparent for years and they should be able to plan for
these delayed claims.' 8 In contrast to this view is the notion that
increasing liability for drug manufacturers will adversely impact the
production of drugs.'09 While safe drugs are a necessary goal, research
and innovation also are important."10
injuries may become more common as science develops further); Comment, DES: Alternative
Theories of Liability, 59 U. DaT. J. URa. L. 387, 411 (1982) (finding that as science, technology,
and medicine advance so does the likelihood of injuries).
103. See Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 610-13, 607 P.2d at 936-37, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144-45. The
California Supreme Court in Sindell did not limit market share liability to DES but instead
made note of the increasing complexity of modern society and the need for new methods to
deal with problems caused by modem society for which the common law did not provide answers.
Id. at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. Sindell could be applied to products such
as cigarettes, food additives, generic drugs, abestos, pesticides, aluminum wire, industrial waste,
and products causing enviromental pollution. Fischer, supra note 62, at 1652.
104. Note, The Special Problem, supra note 2, at 100. See supra notes 55-58 and accom-
panying text.
105. Note, The Special Problem, supra note 2, at 100.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at t00 n.57.
109. See Fern & Sichel, Evolving Tort Liability Theories; Are They Taking the Pharmaceutical
Industry into an Era of Absolute Liability?, 29 ST. Louis U.L.J. 763, 783 (1985). The authors
state that: "Strict liability would be a disincentive to the development, production, and distribution
of vital new medicines, and would adversely affect the availability of existing medicines...
." Id. Furthermore, if strict liability is applied to the pharmaceutical industry, then the ultimate
loser will be the general public. Id. at 785.
110. See Fischer, supra note 62, at 1651-52 (finding that a balance must be struck between
producing safe products and inhibiting production).
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Drug cases are not the only example of delayed manifestation in-
juries involving products liability."'I Injuries attributable to other pro-
ducts also may cause delayed manifestation injuries "without percep-
tible trauma" when a plaintiff is "blamelessly ignorant" of the cause
of the injury. Additionally, the market share liability formulated in
Sindell could apply well beyond drug cases." 2 In these situations, the
rationale of Kensinger would seem to be analogous, and the expanded
rule of discovery may apply.
When faced with problems of delayed manifestation injuries, other
jurisdictions have sought to reduce increased liability of manufacturers
with statutes of repose that cut off liability after a set period of time." 3
Statutes of repose were enacted in an effort to stop the increase in
the number of products liability cases.' Statutes of repose are based
on the premise that a certain degree of stability and predictability
must exist in order for commerce to thrive.' ' 5 Without a statute of
repose, the fear is that manufacturers will be subjected to unlimited
liability." 6 The contrary position is that statutes of repose unjustly
cut off liability before an injured plaintiff is aware of the existence
of a cause of action." 7 At present, however, the California Legislature
has not decided to modify or abrogate the judicially created rule of
discovery in products liability." 8 Since other states have enacted statutes
of repose when products liability has been judicially increased,
Kensinger could incite legislative action to create a statute of repose,
giving manufacturers a time after which they need not fear liability." 19
111. See Dworkin, supra note 62, at 35 n.ll-12, 47 n.89. Delayed manifestation injuries
have been caused by asbestos, "agent orange," beryllium, toxic waste, microwaves, and
formaldehyde. Id. Presently, the number of products liability cases involving delayed manifes-
tion injuries is approaching 100,000 per year. See id. at 47.
112. See Fischer, supra note 62, at 1652. Market share liability under Sindell could apply
to cigarettes, food additives, generic drugs, abestos, pesticides, aluminium wire, industrial waste,
and products causing environmental pollution. Id.
113. See Note, Product Liability Statutes of Repose as Conflicting with State Constitu-
tions: The Plaintiffs are Winning, 26 ARIZ. L. REv. 363, 364-66 (1984).
114. Dworkin, supra note 62, at 33-35. In 1960 the number of products liability cases was
50,000. By 1976 the number of cases had increased to I million. Id. at 34.
115. See id. at 37-38.
116. Note, Constitutional Law-Limitation of Actions-Application of the Products Liability
Statute of Repose, 52 TENN. L. REV. 97, 121 (1984).
117. Id.
118. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
119. For a view holding that the rule of discovery should not be rejected see Note, Delayed
Manifestation Injuries, supra note 2, at 134.
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CONCLUSION
In Kensinger v. Abbott Laboratories, the California Court of Ap-
peal for the First District reversed a lower court dismissal of a DES
suit. The trial court in Kensinger concluded that the cause of action
was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court found that
because Kensinger had known of her injury and the cause of the in-
jury more than one year prior to filing the lawsuit, the elements of
the rule of discovery had been met and that the cause of action was
barred. The court of appeal disagreed, concluding that the statute
of limitations was tolled until Kensinger knew of, or reasonably could
have discovered her injury, the cause of the injury, and the wrong-
doing on the part of the manufacturer. By adding a third level to
the rule of discovery, the court in Kensinger has increased the
likelihood that DES victims will get a day in court.
John M. Felder
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